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NOTES
self-evident that a property tax would not be levied upon development
values which have been surrendered to the state,8" nevertheless subdividers
who dedicate permanent easements to the public have sometimes been
assessed for the full value of the land. 3 Second, a provision limiting
property taxes when development potential is restricted is a powerful
inducement for property owners to surrender freely their development
rights."
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In view of the increasing tempo of urbanization in Indiana, it seems
that land planners should seriously consider the possibilities of "do-it-
yourself-zoning" as an inexpensive method of preserving areas of scenic
beauty. Landowners in areas where urban development is imminent will
not, in most instances, donate development rights to the public even though
they could secure property tax relief by so doing. It would seem though,
that in scenic areas landowners having a compelling interest in main-
taining the land in its present condition might be ready participants in a
"do-it-yourself-zoning" program. In spite of the possibility that only
a limited number of landowners might participate in such a program, the
availability of "do-it-yourself-zoning" could nevertheless play a sig-
nificant role in preserving areas of scenic beauty, for no other comparable
land use program would offer the opportunity, under certain circum-
stances, to reap such large benefits at such a minimal cost.
ORGANIZING THE TOWNHOUSE IN INDIANA*
In one century, the proportion of the American population living in
82. N.Y. MuNic. LAW § 247(3).
83. Cf., e.g., Maisen v. Naxey, 233 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
84. A statute similar to the one under discussion which would only authorize
voluntary transfers of development interests would be of limited value to a state at-
tempting comprehensive preservation of scenic areas since the cooperation of many
landowners is often unattainable. It has been suggested, Note, 75 HARV. L. :RLv. supra
note 7; Note, 12 STAN. L. REv. 638 (1960), that the state employ its power of eminent
domain to permit condemnation of interests restricting land to scenic uses. This pro-
posal raises the difficult question of whether the exercise of the power of eminent domain
to secure limited rights in realty is constitutional when motivated by aesthetic considera-
tions. A decision by the Supreme Court a decade ago in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954), appears to indicate that the power of eminent domain can be exercised for
aesthetic purposes under the fifth amendment. For discussions of the implications of
this case, see Lashly, The Case of Berman, v. Parker: Public Housing and Urban Re-
development, 41 A.B.A.J. 501 (1955) ; Note, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 730 (1955).
* The basic reference for anyone undertaking a study of townhouses is UnANr
LAND INSTITUTE, THE HomEs AssocIATiON HANDBOOK (Technical Bulletin 50, 1964).
This work surveys all aspects of townhouse homes associations and answers all general
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cities has increased by more than forty-nine percent.' This rural to urban
shift, accompanied by an absolute increase in population, naturally has
caused many urban housing problems. "Suburban sprawl predicated on
low density development has forced the inhabitant of the city to live
farther and farther from the center of the metropolitan area while at the
same time it has destroyed open land and created an almost uniformly
monotonous landscape." 2 In its effort to halt this march across the
countryside, the federal government has encouraged cluster developments
comprised of cooperative apartments,' condominiums," or townhouses or
homes associations.'
Since cooperatives are no longer new to the property lawyer and since
many states now have condominium legislation as a guide,' the most
challenging to the lawyer of the three types of cluster developments is
probably the townhouse.' Actually the legal concepts involved in town-
houses are not particularly new; rather they are merely used together in
a new manner.
A townhouse may involve units which are detached and resemble
traditional lot ownership or which are attached to each other and resemble
the row houses which have been so popular on the eastern seaboard. An
architectural compromise of these arrangements may consist of semi-
attached units or clusters of three or four attached units. Such flexibility
naturally makes definition of the townhouse difficult. The purchaser of
a townhouse, as the term is used in this note, receives in fee the land
questions regarding them. This note attempts to pick up where the HANDBOOK stops
and investigate the specific problems that may be encountered in one jurisdiction.
1. UNITED STATES BuEAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1964, TABLE No. 11 (1964). UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HiS-
TORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, SERIES A 195-209
(1960).
2. Alper, Old Orchard Country Club: A Study in Open-land, 23 URBAN LAND 3
(April 1964).
3. Gladstone, The Co-operative Housring Project, 113 J. ACCOUNTANCY 55 (May
1962). And see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 216(a) (allowing deduction to tenant-stock-
holder).
4. National Housing Act § 234, 75 Stat. 160, (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1964).
5. Although Congress has passed no legislation for the specific purpose of assisting
townhouses the Federal Housing Authority has through its literature and cooperation
with developers encouraged this type of housing. McKeever, Trend in Housing, 23
URBAN LAND 2 (Jan. 1964).
6. Note, Condominim-A Comparative Analysis of Condominium Statutes, 13
DE PAUL L. Rav. 111 (1963).
7. Although the townhouse has existed in the United States for over a century
(e.g., Louisburg Square in Boston, Mass., 1826), the concept has not become a popular
housing trend until recently. The Indianapolis Federal Housing Administration office
reports four newly constructed townhouses in Indiana. However, Brendonwood Common
near Indianapolis, the plat for which was recorded on August 21, 1917, and whose
covenants were included in a deed recorded on September 13, 1917, may boast of using
townhouse principles for nearly fifty years.
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beneath his house and perhaps other land (for example, a patio or a
backyard) and the right to participate with other townhouse home owners
in a homes association which owns, controls, and maintains the common
grounds and facilities.' In most townhouses membership is automatic
in the homes association, which is usually organized under a nonprofit
corporation act. Unlike a cooperative arrangement where one has a long-
term leasehold interest in a unit and a share in the cooperative corporation,
the townhouse purchaser acquires fee ownership in his lot. Unlike a
condominium where one owns his living space alone and certain facilities
in cotenancy with those who share these facilities, the townhouse pur-
chaser acquires fee ownership in his lot and an interest in an association
holding title to the common facilities and grounds."0
The townhouse development rests on three legal pillars: (1) the
recorded plat, (2) the homes association with its instruments of organi-
zation, and (3) the declaration of covenants. All of these instruments
should be drawn before the first lot is sold. The instruments will then be
correlated and construed together in establishing the rights of any
interested party."
8. The Urban Land Institute in a study of 349 homes associations found the fol-
lowing distribution of common property usage: (1) recreation area, 22% less than one
half acre and 58% at one half acre or more; (2) swimming pool, 27%; (3) parks, 27%;
(4) entranceways, 48%; common hall, rooms, or gym, 30%. 22 URBAN LAND 10 (July
1963).
9. In their study of 349 townhouse associations, the Urban Land Institute discovered
that 232 had either clearly or largely automatic membership provisions. Ibid. The FHA
requires the townhouse legal instruments to provide for automatic membership in a
nonprofit homes association. FEDERAL HOuSING ADMINISTRATION, PLANNED-UNIT DE-
VELOPUENT WITH A HOMiES ASSOCIATION § 7.1 (Land Planning Bulletin No. 6, 1963).
10. See generally Note, Observations on Condomihlums in Indiana: The Horizontal
Property Act of 1963, 40 Ism. LJ. 57 (1964).
If a townhouse complies with the architectural requirements of the Indiana Hori-
zontal Property Act there is no reason why the cluster development could not be estab-
lished as a condominium under this act instead of as a townhouse. "'Building' means
a building, containing five [5] or more apartments or two [2] or more buildings, each
containing two [2] or more apartments, with a total of five [5] or more apartments for
all such buildings, and comprising a part of the property." IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1202
(Burns Supp. 1964). If the condominium buildings are such that each owner could
hold sole legal title to the land beneath his unit then the development naturally could be
created as a townhouse, but if sole fee ownership is only of space in the sky and could
not be established to cover land immediately beneath, then the common-law or statutory
law of condominium would control.
Although the condominium under the Horizontal Property Act may also employ an
incorporated association, title to common facilities remains in the stockholders them-
selves as co-owners with the corporation serving only as a managing entity. Each apart-
ment owner is entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas. IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 56-1205, 56-1207 (Burns Supp. 1964). Section 56-1208 implies, however, that a
corporation may be used for managerial purposes.
11. Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714
(1956).
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I. THE SUBDIVISION PLAT
A plat is a map of an area of land showing lots, streets, alleys, and
other details and is usually drawn to scale.'2 In Indiana, a plat must be
recorded to create a legal subdivision." As related to townhouses the
specific purposes of the plat are to preserve the title of the common
grounds to the homes association and to insure the home owners easements
of enjoyment over these common grounds.
Since a plat is recognized in Indiana as comparable to a deed in its
legal description,'4 the problems resulting from its use must be approached
with the same concern given to a description composed only of words.
One possible problem is that the grantee home owner will acquire an
unrestricted use of the common grounds and facilities. If this occurs, a
cloud will be cast on the title of the association to the common facilities,
and the cloud may some day prevent the association from mortgaging
the common grounds if a loan is required or eventually from dedicating
the common grounds to the public. In addition, if title in the common
grounds is not clearly reserved to the developer who in turn relinquishes
it to the association, the association later will be prevented from restricting
the rights of the home owner because of unpaid assessments. In Mountain
Springs Ass'n v. Wilson" a lake was shown on the plat and some of the
home owners were delinquent in paying assessments. The court held that
since they acquired the right to bathe in and boat on the lake by pure
easement and a right to fish by profit a pendre appurtenant to the land
conveyed, they could not be restricted in their use of the lake. Con-
sequently, to avoid clouds on the title and to preserve the association's
right to restrict the use of the common grounds, as well as to guarantee
12. Carlsbad v. Caviness, 66 N.W. 230, 346 P.2d 310 (1959), citing BLACK, LAW
D TIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
13. In dicta one court said: "Until the plat of a subdivision is recorded as provided
[by IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-801 (Bums 1963)] no lots designated therein can be sold.
The recording of the plat as provided by statute confirms the subdividing of the land in
the manner and for the purposes shown by the plat, including notice of the dedication
of all streets and alleys. . . . Until the plat is recorded as provided by statute, a
prospective purchaser has no assurance that a subdivision will even be established, and
the lots and streets shown thereon are nothing more than lines on paper. The act of
recording brings the subdivision into being and makes it a reality instead of a mere
outline on paper of a tentative proposal of the subdivider." The court held that a plat
which purports to cover land but which is not recorded is incompetent evidence for the
purpose of showing the value of the land in an action by a utility company to appro-
priate a right of way over the land. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. McCoy, 239 Ind.
301, 307, 157 N.E.2d 181, 184 (1959).
14. Gary Land Co. v. Griesel, 179 Ind. 220, 100 N.E. 835 (1913). For recording
requirements of a plat, see generally IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-701 to -794 (Burns 1964)
and especially IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3242 (Burns 1964) (recording plat outside corpor-
ate limits of town or city) and IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-801 (Burns 1963) (recording of
plat of addition to town or city).
15. 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d 270 (1963).
that the developer will turn control of the common facilities over to the
association at the proper time, the Urban Land Institute has urged that the
drafter place written language on the plat explicitly reserving title of the
common properties to the developer, to be relinquished to the association
by a certain date."6
An even greater threat to the townhouse arrangement than failure of
the developer to fully relinquish title to common property is the loss of
the common properties through implied dedication to the public. Where
this has occurred, assessments may no longer be collected for their main-
tenance ;"T however, assessments may continue to bind home owners where
only part of the common properties have been dedicated and the assess-
ment fees are used to maintain those properties retained."8 Indiana, along
with most states, recognizes both common-law and statutory dedication. "9
Common-law dedication, which involves the danger of unintended implied
dedication, is irrevocable after the sale of any lot with reference to a
plat;2 and this has been held true even though the plat was invalid.2
Thus a designation on the plat of "public square," "street," and "park"
have all been held to imply a common-law dedication.22 Indeed, it has even
been held that a dedication has been made without such designation if
the surrounding circumstances indicate that a dedication was intended
and that apparent as opposed to actual intention to dedicate is sufficient.28
Absence of an exact time in which the local public authority has to
accept a common-law dedication increases the threat of implied dedication.
16. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES AssOCIATION HANDBOOK § 21.4 (Tech-
nical Bulletin 50, 1964). But it has been held that where a note on a plat conflicts with
plat maps the map will control. Hunter v. Eichel, 100 Ind. 463 (1884).
17. Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d 270 (1963).
18. Wehr v. Roland Park Co., 143 Md. 384, 122 Atl. 363 (1923).
19. Murray v. City of Huntingburg, 187 Ind. 504, 119 N.E. 209 (1918) ; Rhodes
v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896); Town of Marion v. Skillman,
127 Ind. 30, 26 N.E. 676 (1890) ; Town of Poseyville v. Gatewood, 65 Ind. App. 50, 114
N.E. 483 (1917); IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-801 (Burns 1963) (statutory dedication). As
to the distinction between statutory and common-law dedication, see YORKLEY, THE LAW
OF SUBDIVISION § 31 (1963).
See generally 4 TIFFANY, R AIL PROPERTY § 1103 (3d ed. 1939). The theoretical
justification for implied dedication has been said to be equitable estoppel. Whippoorwill
Crest Co. v. Stratford, 145 Conn. 268, 141 A.2d 241 (1958) ; Kent v. Pratt, 73 Conn.
573, 48 Atl. 418 (1901).
20. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896).
21. Hall v. Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494, 70 N.E. 883 (1904).
22. See, e.g., Doe v. President, 7 Ind. 641 (1856) (public square), cf. Westfall v.
Hunt, 8 Ind. 174 (1856) ; Steele v. Fowler, 111 Ind. App. 364, 41 N.E.2d 678 (1942)
(street), Walmer v. Town of Bremen, 99 Ind. App. 186, 191 N.E. 175 (1934) (street)
Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896) (park).
23. City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200 (1884) (surrounding circum-
stances) ; City of Evansville v. Evansville Boat Club, 108 Ind. App. 359, 27 N.E.2d 389
(1940) (surrounding circumstances) ; German Bank v. Brose, 32 Ind. App. 77, 69 N.E.
300 (1903) (apparent intent).
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The Indiana courts speak of a "reasonable time" depending on surround-
ing circumstances,24 but in one case the court upheld acceptance through
annexation of the ground covered by a plat recorded thirty years before
the annexation.25 Even implied acceptance of the implied dedication is
sufficient to bind the grantor.26 Only a clear declaration of rights of the
association and the home owner in a plat will prevent later insecurity
regarding title to the common properties."
Under the rules of common-law dedication, once a lot has been sold,
the developer may not alter the plat without the consent of the purchaser."
This rule prevents the developer from backing out of his original offer
of designated common grounds and points out the necessity' of making
the plat initially correct. The public, however, may acquire certain rights
under a plat recorded under statute even before a sale. For example, a
developer's right to vacate a plat29 is subject to remonstrance where vaca-
24. Smith v. State, 217 Ind. 643, 29 N.E.2d 786 (1940).
25. Walmer v. Town of Bremen, 99 Ind. App. 186, 191 N.E. 175 (1934).
26. Hall v. Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494, 70 N.E. 883 (1904). The town of Crown
Point was held to have accepted the dedicated land when the town undertook improve-
ments on the land.
27. The form suggested 'by the Urban Land Institute is as follows: (Name of
developer) in recording this plat of (Name of subdivision) has designated certain land
as ("park," "playground," etc.) intended for use by the home owners in (name of sub-
division) for recreation and other related activities.
The above described areas are not dedicated hereby for use by the general public
but are dedicated to the common use and enjoyment of the homeowners in (name of
subdivision) as more fully provided in article IV, Declaration of Covenants and Re-
strictions applicable to (name of subdivision) dated , 19- and
recorded with this plat. Said article IV is hereby incorporated and made part of this
plat. UmPAr LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES AssOcIATIoN HANDBOOK App. E. (Technical
Bulletin 50, 1964).
In Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Warrum, 42 Ind. 179, 186, 82 N.E. 934, 937
(1907) the court explicitly stated: "There is no such thing at common law or -by virtue
of any provision of our statutes as the dedication of property to a private person or
corporation. Dedications must be made to the public." The court did not discuss the
following statute enacted two years before the decision: "Every donation or grant to
the public, or to any individual, religious society, corporation or body politic, noted as
such on such plat, shall be considered a general warranty to the donee or grantee on
such plat named or indicated, for the purposes intended by the donor or grantor." IND.
ANN. STAT. § 48-801 (Burns 1963). (Emphasis added.) However, in view of the
Pittsburgh holding another term, perhaps "granted," should be substituted for the second
use of "dedicated" if the Urban Land Institute plat form is used in Indiana.
28. Bercot v. Velkoff, 111 Ind. App. 323, 41 N.E.2d 686 (1942).
29. A developer seeking to vacate a street, alley, or other public place within city
or town limits may file his petition with either the circuit court of the county, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-903 (Burns 1963), or the board of public works, IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-2001
(Burns 1963). However, § 48-903 may not be used where the dedicated land is within
a city of the first class, IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-912 (Burns 1963). If a developer desires
to vacate a highway dedication which lies outside of town or city limits, the developer
must file with the board of county commissioners, IND. ANN. STAT. § 65-118 (Burns
1953). If he desires to vacate dedicated land which lies outside the town or city limits,
he must file with the circuit court. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-903 (Burns 1963).
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tion would harm the public.3" A later Indiana statute has further protected
the public by giving the local planning commission a veto over vacation
or alteration of plat. The commission's veto may be overridden only by a
two-thirds vote of the city council or by a unanimous vote of the county
council. 1
The public interest in the development is also protected through
zoning and architectural requirements. Courts have upheld density zoning
designed to protect the public health, safety, and general welfare and not
to preserve the status of a particular residential area;2 and they have
upheld various minimum lot sizes." Most of these density zoning
ordinances reflect the lot-by-lot residential development of the past and
not the cluster subdivision development being encouraged today. Con-
sequently, townhouse developers are likely to encounter zoning problems.
Some courts have upheld townhouse variances made on condition of
dedication of common properties34 while others have prevented townhouse
construction in spite of such dedication. " Architectural requirements
30. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-2001 (Burns 1963) provides that the board of public
works shall consider remonstrances for those interested in or affected by such proceed-
ings. Where a first class city is involved see IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-914 (Burns 1963).
Vacation under IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-903 (Bums 1963) is also made subject by that
section to remonstrance, and the court shall grant the remonstrance petition in whole or
in part when "justice shall require it." Remonstrance under § 48-903 is limited by §
48-904 to those situations where (1) the dedicated land is necessary for the growth of
a town or city, or (2) vacation would deprive the remonstrants of their right to ingress
or egress, or (3) the vacation would deprive the public's access to public buildings or
grounds. These have been held to be the only grounds for remonstrance. Peru v. Cox,
173 Ind. 241, 90 N.E. 7 (1909); Richmond v. Muller, 58 Ind. App. 20, 107 N.E. 550
(1915).
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-744 (Burns 1964).
32. Dillard v. North Hills, 195 Misc. 875, 91 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1949).
33. See, e.g., Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 336 Mo. 1025, 246
S.W.2d 771 (1952) (three acres) ; Franmor Realty Corp. v. Village of Old Westbury,
280 App. Div. 945, 116 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1952) (one acre); Grignoux v. Village of Kings
Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1950) (one half acre). In Indiana the city
council or board of county commissioners may regulate the intensity of land use. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 53-756 (Burns 1964). However, there are no reported cases indicating
the limits of their power.
34. Chrinko v. South Brunswick Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221
(1963). This case has been criticized for its suggestion that dedication of open spaces
in conjunction with a petition for zoning variance is a requirement. 22 URBAN LAND 2
(June 1963). See generally Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open
Space, 9 VILL. L. REV. 559, 580-586 (1964).
35. Hiscox v. Levine, 31 Misc. 2d 151, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1961). As a result of
this case the New York legislature provided for cluster zoning in an amendment giving
the planning board great flexibility in its means of assuring the preservation of the
common properties for their intended purposes. N.Y. TowN LAW § 281 (as amended by
N.Y. LAws, ch. 963).
The Louisville Courier-Journal, November 8, 1964, § 5, p. 1, tells of one developer
who after an 84,000 investment in the construction site failed in three attempts in more
than a year to achieve the zoning approval necessary for his proposed cluster develop-
ment
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often are imposed by the local governments in conjunction with these zon-
ing requirements,"6 just as the Federal Housing Administration has im-
posed architectural requirements for developers to qualify for a FHA
loan."7
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE HOMES ASSOCIATION
The homes association is the entity which owns and maintains the
common grounds. In addition, it provides a democratic forum for the
home owners in discussing common problems. As in the filing of the
subdivision plat, the organization for the homes association should be
established before any lot is sold. Although most homes associations
are organized under a state nonprofit corporation statute, the association
also may be formed as an unincorporated association or as a business trust.
The non-profit corporation form derives its popularity from the legal
disadvantages of the two alternative devices.
The chief disadvantages of the unincorporated association result
from the commonly stated principle that such associations have no legal
existence.3" As a result of this principle an unincorporated association is
incapable as an organization of taking or holding either real or personal
property in its associate name 9 in the absence of a special statute40 em-
powering it to do so. The lack of a legal existence prevents the unin-
corporated association from acting in business transactions as a legal
entity under the association name. Since the officers of an unincorporated
association are agents of the members rather than of the association as a
legal entity, when acting for the association they may make contracts which
36. E.g., Marion County, Ind., Metropolitan Plan Commission Ordinance 64-AO-4,
August 4, 1964, amending Ordinance 8-1957, March 28, 1957.
37. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, MINIMUM PROPERTY STANDARDS FOR
MuLTIFAmILY HOUSING 34-47 (1963). The Marion County Ordinance, note 36 supra,
and the FHA have remarkably similar townhouse requirements respecting maximum
floor area, minimum open space, minimum livability space, minimum recreation space,
and minimum parking area.
38. Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113 (1933) ; Karges Furni-
ture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905).
39. Popovich v. Yugoslavia Nat'l Home Soc'y, 106 Ind. App. 195, 18 N.E.2d 948
(1939). Although implying that the members may hold title to property conveyed to
the association, the court expressly declined to decide whether the members hold as joint
tenants or tenants in common. Such cotenancy would pose the threat of possible parti-
tion. See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 6.19-.20 (Casner ed. 1952).
There is authority in other states that the members of an association may hold title
jointly as individuals. Curtiss v. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154 (1848); Whipple v. Parker, 29
Mich. 369 (1874); Guild v. Allen, 28 R.I. 430, 67 Atl. 855 (1907). Consequently, a
grant to an association may be construed as a grant to its members. Reynolds v. St.
John's Grand Lodge, A.F. & A.M., 171 La. 395, 131 So. 186 (1930); Byam v. Bickford,
140 Mass. 31, 2 N.E. 687 (1885).
40. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-1501 (Burns 1960) does permit particular named
societies and religious, educational, and scientific associations to purchase, grant, and
devise land not exceeding 160 acres.
are personally binding on all the members and may incur tort liability for
which all members are liable."'
The owners also may organize through some form of the "Massachu-
setts trust" where the trustees act as the board of directors and the home
owners are the beneficiaries. The 1963 Indiana Business Trust Acte2
gives statutory recognition to this form of business organization. The
act specifically provides for the free transferability of trust interests.' 3
Other advantages include the unrestricted right to deal with land and the
right to sue in the business trust name.4" The act also provides that the
trust instruments shall be subject to statutory and common-law limitation,
but the act specifically states that instruments may limit the liability of the
trust members.4 Since the common law also provides for limited tort and
contractual liability of business trust members, there is little doubt about
this safeguard. This limited liability may, however, be lost in some
situations. The home owners naturally would expect to exercise some
control over the common areas and their common townhouse problems,
and the common-law of business trusts indicates that too much control
(for example, the control normally exercised by stockholders in a cor-
poration) will result in the unlimited liability of the members as general
partners.4" The apparent limited liability of the trustee may also prove to
be illusory. Although the cases indicate that the trust instrument may
effectively exclude trustees from personal contractual liability,48 at least
one case" has indicated that the trust instrument may not prevent the
trustees from being personally liable for torts committed by an employee
of the trust. Consequently, although organization under the Indiana
Business Trust Act is substantially more practical than organization as an
41. Phillips v. Aurora Lodge No. 104 I.O.G.T., 87 Ind. 505 (1882) (contracts);
Todhunter v. Randall, 29 Ind. 275 (1868) (contracts) ; PRossRR, LAW OF TORTS, 479-80(3d ed. 1964) ; Garfinkel, Liability of Menbers and Officers of Nonprofit Unincorpor-
ated Associations for Contracts and Torts, 42 CAn'. L. REV. 812 (1954).
Under IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-220 (Burns Supp. 1964) one person may sue or defend
for others in an association if they have common or general interests. See Lafayette
Chap. of Property Owners' Ass'n v. Lafayette, 129 Ind. App. 425, 157 N.E.2d 287
(1959) ; Board of Comm'rs of Vanderburgh County v. Sanders, 218 Ind. 43, 30 N.E.2d
713 (1940).
42. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-4801 to -4811 (Burns Supp. 1963).
43. IN r. ANN. STAT. § 25-4802 (Burns Supp. 1963).
44. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4808 (Burns Supp. 1963).
45. Ibid.
46. Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 107 (1945).
47. See generally id. at 42; Note, Liability of Shareholder-In a Business Trust-
The Control Test, 48 VA. L. REv. 1105 (1962).
48. Annot., 156 A.L.R. 22, 174 (1945). The Indiana Business Trust Act charges
those dealing with the trust with notice of the trust instrument IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-
4808 (Bums Supp. 1963).
49. Fischeries Co. v. McCoy, 202 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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unincorporated association, the problems of unlimited liability may still
exist.
These disadvantages are largely obviated by organization of the
association under the Indiana Not For Profit Corporation Act.5" Success-
ful incorporation under this act enables the homes association to hold
and dispose of realty and personalty, to engage in broad financial trans-
actions, and "to do all acts and things necessary, convenient or expedient
to carry out the purposes for which it is formed."'" Perhaps most
important, tort and contract liability of individual members is limited to
the extent of unpaid dues or assessments.52 The chief potential disad-
vantage of a corporation, the double tax feature, may not even be
applicable to townhouses.5
50. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-507 to -553 (Burns 1960). For the disadvantages of
the corporate form see Bredell, Re-exanination of the Desirability of the Corporate
Form of Business Organization, 13 IND. L.J. 533 (1938).
51. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-510(b) (4) (deal in realty), 25-510(b) (5) (engage in
financial transactions), 25-510(b) (11) (do all things necessary, etc.) (Burns 1960).
52. IN . ANN. STAT. § 25-513 (Burns 1960).
53. The homes association may qualify for exemption as a club "organized and
operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other non-profitable purposes, no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholders." INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (7). There are two other possible grounds for deduction
which are less likely to be successful. One of the possible grounds for exemption would
be the classification of the homes association as a nonprofit organization "operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (4).
The second would be to qualify the homes association as a charitable organization. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3). For an excellent discussion of these grounds for
corporate tax exemptions and the possible applicability to membership dues of the excise
tax, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 4241, see HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 28.3.
The trust and the association may also be subject to the double taxation of the
corporation. See generally Wolfman & Price, Qualifying Under Final Kitner Rules
Will Be Difficult It Most States, 15 J. TAXATION 105 (1961). For corporate income
tax purposes the Treasury Regulations define an "association" as "an organization whose
characteristics require it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation rather
than as another type of organization such as a partnership or a trust." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960). Six characteristics are "ordinarily found in a pure corpora-
tion which, taken together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (1) as-
sociates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (3) con-
tinuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property, and (6) free transferability of interests." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960). The necessary characteristics are associates and the con-
ducting of a business for profit. The only foreseeable instance where the townhouse
may be classified as operating for profit is where the townhouse has purchased a unit
under a first option provision and is renting it. Income to an entity which reduces
expenses owed it by its members is not subject to income tax deductions. Chicago & W.
Ind. R.R. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1962); Anaheim Union Water Co.,
35 T.C. 1072 (1961). Organization under the Indiana Business Trust Act would prob-
ably satisfy the last three requirements (see notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text).
A common-law association, however, would not seem to satisfy the requirements of
limited liability (see note 44 supra and accompanying text) or free transferability of
interests (see notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text), though it may satisfy the
requirement of centralized management.
NOTES
III. THE DECLARATION OF COVENANTS
Careful drafting of organization instruments may eliminate many
problems,"' but the instruments can compel neither membership nor the
payment of maintenance assessments. To compel membership and (what
is infinitely more important to the home owner and to the association) to
compel the payment of assessments, the binding legal force must be con-
tained in the declaration of covenants. When this is done, it has been
held that a home owner may not withdraw his membership and thereby
relieve himself of assessment obligations even though the act governing
the incorporated homes association has expressly provided for voluntary
withdrawal of membership." But when assessments are permitted under
the authority of the covenants they must be created or altered in accord-
ance with the organization instruments; and any deviation in their passage
from the procedure prescribed in those instruments may make those
assessments void."'
Consequently, the instrument which is most vital to the successful
creation of the townhouse is the declaration of covenants. The subject
of covenants is a complex area of the law which has been discussed in
great depth in many decisions and commentaries. As a result, the attempt
here is merely to analyze those covenant problems peculiar to townhouses
against a background of Indiana law on covenants."
Restrictive Covenants
Because the homes association is not the common grantor and be-
cause it probably does not have title to any of the townhouse lots covered
by the declaration, there may be some question as to the homes associa-
tion's standing to enforce the covenants. One justification for its standing
may be founded on the theory of third party beneficiary contracts."
Many courts have held that any party intended to benefit from the
covenants may enforce them;"9 others have held that mere benefit alone
54. The Urban Land Institute in its HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 16 at Apps. G.,
H. provides, respectively, a model form for the articles of incorporation and a model
form for the bylaws.
55. Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 565, 295 P.2d 714
(1956), based on WASH. REV. CODE § 24.04.040 (1959) which closely resembles IND.
ANN. STAT. § 25-504 (Burns 1960).
56. Novemac, Inc. v. Centre Hill Court, 164 Va. 151, 178 S.E. 877 (1935).
57. See generally Gavit, Covenants Running With the Land, 5 IND. L.J. 432 (1930).
58. 4 CoRaiN, COaRcTs § 808 (1951).
59. Weschmeyer v. Finch, 231 Ind. 282, 107 N.E.2d 661 (1952) ; Club Manor, Inc.
v. Oheb Shalom Congregation, 211 Md. 465, 128 A.2d 405 (1925) ; Indian Village Ass'n
v. Barton, 312 Mich. 541, 20 N.W.2d 304 (1945) ; Chuba v. Glasgow, 61 N.M. 302, 299
P.2d 774 (1956) ; Nassau County v. Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1940) ; Ken-
nilwood Owners' Ass'n v. Kennilwood Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 239, aff'd, 28 N.Y.S.2d 154,
262 App. Div. 750 (1941).
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is not sufficient,"0 though clear designation in the covenants themselves
may be."' Consequently, the importance of a clear designation that the
homes association is intended to be benefited and has the capacity to
enforce the covenants should be plainly stated within the covenants them-
selves.
Even if such a statement is inadvertently omitted or is included but
given no effect by the court, the homes association's standing to enforce
might be justified on the theory that the common grantor has assigned
his rights and interests to the homes association. But enforcement of
restrictive covenants requires that the original covenantee owned the
lands benefited by the covenants and conveyed this benefited land to the
assignee. 2 Although the homes association received the common proper-
ties from the common grantor, it may not be possible to relate all land
use restrictions to the enjoyment of the common properties (that is, the
assignee association may not be able to show that the common grounds
are benefited by all restrictions).
A third possible justification for the association's standing to sue
on the covenants is that the association is acting as a representative of
the home owners. This theory actually was used in several townhouse
cases where the issue arose.6" Since this theory depends on the ability of
60. Metryclub Gardens Ass'n v. Friedrichs, 121 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1960);
Princeton Constr. Corp. v. Dasoph Realty Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 18, aff'd, 263 App. Div.
994, 34 N.Y.S.2d 151, appeal denied, 263 App. Div. 1010, 34 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1942) ; New-
berry Land Co. v. Newberry, 95 Va. 119, 27 S.E. 899 (1897).
61. Taylor v. Melton, 130 Colo. 280, 274 P.2d 977 (1954) ; Newberry Land Co. v.
Newberry, 95 Va. 119, 27 S.E. 899 (1897).
62. Boyd v. Park Realty Corp., 137 Md. 36, 111 Atl. 129 (1920) ; Graves v. Deter-
ling, 120 N.Y. 447, 24 N.E. 655 (1890); Wald v. West MacGregor Protective Ass'n,
332 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). See also URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES
ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK § 22.2 (Technical Bulletin 50, 1964).
In American Cannel Coal Co. v. Indiana Cotton Mills, 78 Ind. App. 115, 134 N.E.
891, 893 (1922), the court stated: "[W]hen such grantor or one claiming under it ceases
to hold such contiguous land, the covenant becomes personal, and equity will not enjoin
a violation thereof in favor of the assignee of the covenantee or against the assignee of
the covenantor." The important point is, of course, not that the dominant land be
contiguous to the servient land, but that the dominant land must be held by an assignee
who continues to benefit from the covenant. This is the holding of Graves v. Deterling,
supra, which was favorably cited in the Indiana case.
63. One court, while noting that the homes association was a separate corporate
entity, recognized that it existed as a convenient instrument to advance the common
interests of the home owners. "Only blind adherence to an ancient formula devised to
meet entirely different conditions could constrain the court to hold that a corporation
formed as a medium for the enjoyment of common rights of property owners owns no
property which could benefit by enforcement of common rights and has no cause of
action in equity to enforce the covenant upon which such common rights depend."
Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
262, 115 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1938).
In Garden Dist. Property Owners' Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 98 So. 2d 922
(La. App. 1958), the court upheld a homes association's suit on the covenants under
L.S.A.-R.S. § 12:101 which provides that a nonprofit corporation may perform "those
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the home owners themselves to enforce the restrictions, it may be necessary
where the covenants have not been included (either in their entirety or by
reference to a declaration of covenants) in all deeds to invoke the doctrine
of reciprocal negative easements. This doctrine makes restrictions con-
tained in a first deed by a common grantor applicable to land held by the
grantor and even enables the first grantees with restrictions in their deeds
to enforce them against subsequent grantees without restrictions in their
deeds if the circumstances indicate that the grantor's original intention
was to submit the property to a common scheme.
0 4
If the declaration of covenants is properly filed, it should serve as
adequate notice to any third party acquiring an interest in a home owner's
townhouse fee. Therefore, both purchasers and mortgage lenders will take
their interest subject to the covenant's building restrictions. Assuming
they both are put on notice by adequate recording, the purchaser will
take this outstanding interest of the other subdivision home owners into
account when he buys, and the mortgage lender will figure these out-
standing interests into his appraisal of the property.
But where the mortgage lender loans money to the developer to
meet expenses in the acquisition of the subdivision land or in the con-
struction of the townhouse buildings, the declaration of covenants will
not have been filled yet. Without a filing the mortgage lender will not
have notice of an outstanding interest, and the justification for making
his security interest subject to the interest of the other home owners will
not exist. Although the mortgage interest may expire for each lot as the
developer sells it to a home owner, the remaining lots, if taken through
a foreclosure sale, will not be subject to the covenants. In fact, it has been
held that the covenants covering those lots which have been sold and are
no longer subject to the mortgage are unenforceable because the covenants
do not affect all the lots in the subdivision as originally intended."5
acts which are necessary or proper to accomplish the purpose or purposes as expressed
or implied in the articles, or that may be incidental thereto." Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. §
25-511(b) (11) (Burns 1960) giving a nonprofit corporation the power "to do all acts
and things necessary, covenient or expedient to carry out the purposes for which it is
formed."
The homes association may point out to the court that it is recognized by Indiana
Marketable Title Act as capable of representing the home owners in preserving covenant
interests which would otherwise lapse in fifty years from the original recording date.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1104 (Burns Supp. 1964).
64. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.33 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 866, 867 (3d ed. 1939) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 527 (1944).
For cases holding that Indiana agrees, see Wischmeyer v. Finch, 231 Ind. 282, 107
N.E.2d 661 (1952) ; Elliott v. Keely, 121 Ind. App. 529, 98 N.E.2d 374 (1951).
65. Boyd v. Park Realty Corp., 137 Md. 36, 111 Atl. 129 (1920). But see Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Drauver, 183 Old. 579, 83 P.2d 840 (1938). Both courts invoked the
test of whether the changed conditions so destroyed the original general plan as to
warrant nullifying the existing covenants. Although the courts did not dwell on the
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In order to preserve the covenants for the sake of those who have
already purchased lots with the expectation of their enforcement, the
mortgage lender must agree to subject his security interest to the coven-
ants which are to be recorded; and the FHA so requires.66 An agreement
by the mortgage lender releasing his prior security interest would seem
to be enforceable on the same bases, either contract or estoppel, as a
senior mortgage lender's agreement to subordinate his claim to a junior
mortgage lender is enforceable." The fact that the subordination agree-
ment is made before the covenants are filed or before anyone acquires an
interest under the covenants would not seem to weaken the agreement,
for the courts have held that one may enforce a mortgage subordination
agreement without being a party to it."5
Even if the mortgage lender has not agreed to subject his claim to
the assessment lien at the time of the loan, he may later agree to this.
Although it may seem at first that a mortgage lender would not wish
to voluntarily subordinate his security interest to another interest, the
mortgage lender may realize that failure to subordinate his interest risks
destroying the restrictive covenants for the remainder of the subdivision
and may conclude that to retain the value of his security these restrictions
are necessary. The case law seems to enforce a subordination agreement
against a purchaser at a foreclosure sale even where the agreement was
signed after the original mortgage was made if all parties (mortgagor,
mortgage lender, and those who have already purchased subject to the
restrictions) expressly agree on this enforcement.69
The establishment of high real estate values in a neighborhood is
intent of the covenanting parties, a savings clause in the covenants calling for the
continuance of the covenants as long as a stated minimum number of the lots would
remain bound would likely affect the courts' application of this test
66. FEDmA HOUSING ADmINISTRATION, UNDERWRITERS HANDBOOK: HOAIE MORT-
GAGES § 70440.2 stipulates: "Protective covenants should provide suitable enforcement
provisions, be recorded in the public land records and be superior to the lien of any
mortgage that may be on record prior to the recording of the protective covenants. .. "
67. Some courts have justified such a subordination agreement on the theory that
equity will enforce a contract upon valuable consideration. McCaslin v. Advance Mfg.
Co., 155 Ind. 298, 58 N.E. 67 (1900); Brown v. Barber, 244 Mo. 138, 148 S.W. 892
(1912) ; Gillig v. Maass, 28 N.Y. 191 (1863). Other courts have used the theory of
estoppel. Rose v. Provident Savings, Loan & Investment Ass'n, 28 Ind. App. 25, 62 N.E.
293 (1901). But a mere statement of intention is considered not sufficient for the
application of the estoppel doctrine. BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 636 (6th ed.). But see M-L
Servicing, Inc. v. Buggs, 5 App. Div. 1042, 173 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1958).
In Boyd v. Park Realty Corp., 137 Md. 36, 111 Atl. 129 (1920), the court suggested
the use of a subordination agreement as protection for the townhouse purchasers.
68. Mitchell v. West End Park Co., 171 Ga. 878, 156 S.E. 888 (1930) ; Liebers v.
Plainfield Spanish Homes Bldg. Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 391, 155 AtI. 270 (1931); Londner v.
Perlman, 129 App. Div. 93, 113 N.Y. Supp. 420, aff'd 198 N.Y. 629, 92 N.E. 1090 (1908).
69. Rubel Bros. v. Dumont Coal & Ice Co., 110 Misc. 32, 180 N.Y.S. 662 (1920);
Cleveland Baptist Ass'n v. Scovil, 107 Ohio St. 67, 140 N.E. 647 (1923).
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probably best attained not through restrictive covenants concerning mini-
mum building standards but through the presence of neighbors who take
personal pride in the upkeep of their homes. The quality of his neighbors
is especially important to the townhouse purchaser, since the success of
the townhouse may depend on the financial ability of its members to
continue paying assessments. Also, the home owners will fraternize at
both the common recreational facilities and the association business meet-
ings. For both of these reasons there is more justification for allowing
townhouse home owners control of who their neighbors are to be than
exists with respect to ordinary home ownership.
An attempt to limit the home owner's discretion in the sale of his
house must overcome the twin rules against restraint on alienation and
against perpetuities. Indiana has expressly adopted the common-law rule
against perpetuities requiring that property interests vest not later than
lives in being plus twenty-one years."' Since the present act is a relatively
recent replacement of another act,71 there are no cases clearly interpreting
the present act. Cases under the old act which indicated that an absolute
restraint on alienation within the period of perpetuities is valid are now
placed in doubt." If the new act receives a similarly liberal interpretation,
it may be possible for the homes association to prevent a home owner
from selling to a buyer not approved by the association. This right of
the association would, of course, have to appear within the covenants and
would have to be so stated as to be exercised within one life in being
plus twenty-one years.
Perhaps the safest technique under this act would be to provide in the
covenants for the homes association's right of first refusal; the home
owner would be required under the covenants to sell his lot to the associa-
tion if it matches the amount the lot owner would receive by selling on
the open market. To hold such an option arrangement invalid under
the rule against perpetuities, a court would have to find (1) that the option
creates an interest in property, (2) that the property interest created is
70. An interest in property shall not be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one [21] years after a life or lives in being at the creation of
the interest. It is the intention by the adoption of this act to make effective
in Indiana what is generally known as the common law rule against perpetuities,
except as provided in sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 [§§ 51-106-56-109] of this act.
IND. ANN. Srxr. § 51-105 (Burns 1964).
71. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, ch. 23, §§ 40, 41, repealed by Ind. Acts 1945, ch. 216,§ 1.
72. Minter v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 95 Ind. App. 204, 182 N.E. 87 (1932); Vauble-
v. Lang, S1 Ind. App. 96, 140 N.E. 69 (1923); Matlock v. Lock 38 Ind. App. 281, 73
N.E. 171 (1905). These cases are against the general weight of authority and probably"
resulted from confusion in interpreting the old act See also 6 AmERICAN LAW Or"
PROPERTY § 26.17 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Gavit, Future Interests in Indiana, 3 IND. L.J. 506
(1928).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
contingent, and (3) that the contingent interest did not vest within the
allotted time, usually one life in being plus twenty-one years." As to the
first point, the court in Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co. of Indianapolis held
that an option to purchase land contained within a franchise contract
does not create either a legal or an equitable interest in the land and,
therefore, is not subject to the rule against perpetuities.75 However, since
this was a federal diversity case which cited no supporting Indiana
precedent, it must be considered rather weak authority at best. The case
is also weak because the option was to be exercised by the grantee under
a lease. Such an agreement is frequently made an exception to the rule
in order to encourage the lessee to make capital improvements on the
land."6 Options to purchase satisfy the second point, for there is no real
authority holding them to be present vested rights."' If the option is
found to be a contingent interest in property, to meet the third requirement
it must be stated in such a manner that it must vest within a life in being
plus twenty-one years. Options contracted to last for a calendar time
longer than twenty-one years would fail since theoretically all lives in
being could end within any stated time period and only the twenty-one
year period would be left to protect interests which by their language
must vest in that time. 8 Therefore, in order to take advantage of the
longest period protected by the statute, the option would have to be
written in language requiring its termination within multiple lives in
being plus twenty-one years. This may severely hamper the restrictive
73. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 329 (4th ed.).
74. 46 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied 283 U.S. 852 (1931).
75. Probably a majority of courts have held that an option to purchase real prop-
erty, not limited as to the time it may be exercised by the rule against perpetuities, is
invalid. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 913 Conn. 518, 107 Ati. 138 (1919); Turner
v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870 (1922) ; Henderson v. Veil, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918) ;
Maddox v. Keeler, 250 Ky. 250, 62 S.W.2d 792 (1933); Eastman Marble Co. v. Ver-
mont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920) ; Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348,
92 AUt. 312 (1914) ; Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923) ;
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 395 (1944). In H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, supra,
and Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., supra, the option was characterized
as a contingent future equitable interest.
76. See Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply C., 109 Md. 131, 71 AUt. 442 (1908).
And see State ex rel. Everett Trust & Say. Co. v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash.
2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945) ; Koegh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925).
77. Only one case has ever held that options to purchase are present vested rights.
Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartweight, 11 Ch. D. (1879), overruled in London & S.W.R.
Co. v. Gorman, 20 Ch. D. (1882).
78. See Weitzmann v. Weitzmann, 87 Ind. App. 236, 161 N.E. 385 (1928) (an
option to buy realty limited to the life of the holder held valid under the rule against
perpetuities). But see discussion at note 74 supra. See also Dow v. Yingling, 95 Ind.
App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1932) (option to buy stock upheld).
Under the old act, one did not even have the twenty-one year grace period. Any
statement of duration in calendar time (for example, one day) took the period out of
the one life period required by the act. Phillips v. Heldt, 33 Ind. App. 388, 71 N.E. 520.
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capacity of an exclusive townhouse created to last for a longer time than
lives in being plus twenty-one years. The formal language would, of
course, not be necessary if Indiana courts should hold that options are
excluded from the rule against perpetuities or that the interest was a
vested one.
Affirmative Covenants
Without a source of funds the homes association cannot fulfill its
main function of maintaining the common properties; therefore, the
covenants for assessments are essential to the success of a townhouse.
Like the restrictive covenants, the covenants for assessments may take
different forms.79 The essential difference from the restrictive covenants
is, of course, that the obligations undertaken are affirmative and not
negative.
Historically, courts have expressed a greater reluctance to enforce
covenants which are affirmative. This reluctance was first expressed in
Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Socy,s° which held that equity would not
enforce an affirmative covenant even though the defendant had notice
of it."' In the United States this refusal to enforce affirmative covenants
has been followed most notably by New York in the landmark case of
Miller v. Clary.2  The remaining jurisdictions have enforced them as
"equitable servitudes.""s Even where the affirmative covenants do not
satisfy the requirements necessary to run at law, it may be possible to
enforce the covenants as liens on the land. 4
79. The basis of the assessment is one important variable. The most popular basis
is a dollar amount per lot. Other bases include a stated rate per square foot, a per-
centage of the real estate estate taxes levied, and a rate applied to tax assessed valua-
tion. See HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 69 at § 12.34. In Henlopen Acres v. Potter,
36 Del. Ch. 141, 127 A.2d 476 (1956), the court upheld townhouse maintenance assess-
ments where a home owner refused to pay because the market valuation or "sales price"
basis required the defendant to pay more than other members. The court reasoned that
the amount was determined by private contract and was presumably reasonable.
80. 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
81. Actually there were cases decided before Haywood in which equity enforced
affirmative covenants against purchasers with notice. Morland v. Cook, L.R. 6 Eq. 252
(1868) ; Cook v. Chilott, 3 Ch. D. 694 (1876).
82. 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). See Kettle River Co. v. Eastern Ry., 41
Minn. 461, 43 N.W. 469 (1889) ; DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 50 N.J.
Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388 (Ch. 1892).
83. Murphy v. Kerr, 5 Fed. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925); Whittenton Mfg. Co. v.
Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895).
84. Under the lien theory, equity will impose a lien or a charge upon land to enforce
the payment of a sum of money which according to the conveyance of the land was to
be secured by the land itself. 4 PomaEROY, EgUITY JURIsPRUDENcE (5th ed. 1941) §§
1244-1248; 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 540 (1944).
The equitable lien will be enforced although there is no covenant which satisfies the
requirements to run at law. Orchard Homes Ditch Co. v., Suavely, 117 Mont. 484, 159
P.2d 521 (1945); Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom & Lumber Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44
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But since it may be desirable to bind the covenator personally,85 the
present day strength of Miller v. Clary deserves further consideration.
From the very beginning the apparent black letter rule against affirmative
covenants had exceptions.86 The New York courts recognized one excep-
tion in Lawrence Park Realty Co. v. Crichtons' where the court upheld
covenants calling for the payment to a subdivision developer of expenses
to maintain private roads, walks, sewers, and drains. And in Neponsit
Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank,"8 where the
covenant was expressed as a lien, the court upheld the payment of main-
tenance assessments to a homes association also as a real covenant running
with the land imposing a contractual or personal obligation on the
S.E. 520 (1903) (failure to satisfy requirement of privity of estate between covenantor
and covenantee) ; Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895)
(failure to satisfy state requirements of a seal) ; REsTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 540, com-
ment h (1944).
Some cases have even held that where an assignee is liable on covenants for the
payment of money on the lien theory, he is also bound contractually, i.e. he is bound
personally. Howard Mfg. Co. v. Walter Lot Co., 53 Ga. 689 (1875); Stevens Co. v.
Lisk, 240 N.C. 289, 82 S.E.2d 99 (1954); Ball v. Rio Grande Canal Co., 256 S.W. 678
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
85. The assessment lien may be subordinate to both a mortgage on the property
(see text accompanying notes 107-08 infra) and a statutory homestead exemption. If it
is subject to both, there may 'be nothing left from the property to satisfy the assessment
fee.
Homestead exemptions vary greatly (e.g., $100, MD. CONST. art. 3 § 44, and $10,000
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-1201 (1948), So. DAN. CODE § 51.1802 (1939)) and may or may
not be subordinate to the assessment lien. Indiana's homestead exemption is $700, IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-3501 (Burns 1933). The Indiana courts have not yet been confronted
with the issue of priority between assessments and the homestead exemption, but the courts
have held that mortgaged property cannot be claimed as exempt from the mortgage
foreclosure sale. Russell v. Bruce, 159 Ind. 553, 64 N.E. 602, aff'd on rehearing 65 N.E.
585 (1902) ; Love v. Blair, 72 Ind. 281 (1880). On the other hand, one court in holding
that exempt property is unaffected by an execution lien and may be alienated even while
the writs are in the hands of an officer has claimed that the exemption statute is "based
upon consideration of public policy and humanity . .. and the same should be liberally
construed in favor of the debtor." Cowan Trust Co. v. Treesh, 199 Ind. 24, 29, 155
N.E. 42, 44 (1927).
See HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 69, at § 23.5; Hoskens, Homestead Exemption,
63 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1950) ; Stanley, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time For Modern-
ization, 34 IND. L.J. 355 1959).
86. Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer, 195 N.Y. 185, 88 N.E. 29 (1909) party walls);
Post v. West Shore Ry. Co., 123 N.Y. 580, 26 N.E. 7 (1890) (covenant to maintain
railroad crossing); Slattery v. Erie R.R. Co., 113 App. Div. 462, 99 N.Y. Supp. 309
(1906) (covenant to build fence) ; Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio 284 (N.Y. 1846) (covenant in
lease to pay rent or keep in repair). The court indicated that exceptions were recognized
by the English courts and that future exception was necessary. "It [the rule against
affirmative covenants] has its limitations as has been seen, and may require further
limitation; but the present case is one in which the rule should be applied." Miller v.
Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114, 1117 (1913). Although the court did not clearly
indicate the reason for applying the rule in that particular case, the reason may have
been because the remedy sought was a mandatory injunction. See note 89 infra.
87. 218 App. Div. 374, 218 N.Y. Supp. 278 (1926).
88. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
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assignee."0 The court in both Lawrence and Neponsit recognized that it
would be unjust to hold otherwise, for the plaintiff home owners had, in
compliance with the covenants, incurred expenses which inured to the
benefit of the defendant's land.9" Subsequent New York decisions which
have held that the affirmative burdens involved did not run with the
land"' indicate that Lawrence and Neponsit" are only exceptions to the
89. The prolonged discussion of the facts satisfying the requirements of privity
and especially touch and concern would seem to justify this contention that the court
was concerned with the validity of dual remedies.
However, the Neponsit case has been read by the Urban Land Institute, HANDBOOK,
op. cit. supra note 69, at § 23.24, as concerning only the validity of the equitable lien
since that was all that was provided for in the covenants and since the plaintiff only
sought the enforcement of that lien. Read from this point of view, the court instead of
liberalizing the enforcement of affirmative covenants has actually retarded this recent
trend by attaching the requirements of real covenants to equitable lien remedies. If this
is true, then the lien theory as a means of enforcing the assessments has been greatly
weakened despite the theory's protection by courts which appeared hostile to affirmative
covenants.
Evidence of this acceptance of the lien theory is found in the language of Haywood
v. Brunswick Bldg. Soc., 8 Q.B.D. 403, 409 (1881), that a "charge" may run and in the
fact that Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913), like Haywood, involved
the request for a mandatory injunction. The court's statement in Miller v. Clary, supra,
that covenants which impose charges on land bind the assigns of the covenantor as equit-
able obligations and the court's favorable citation of Denham v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1862), which enforced a covenant requiring a tenant in common to contribute to
the cost of a dam, tend to add further support to this position. Denham was distinguished
from the situation then confronting the court on the basis that the parties to the action
there were tenants in common and were jointly enjoying the benefit. This dictum would
seem to exclude from the general rule announced condominiums (where the owners are
tenants in common in holding common areas) and perhaps townhouses (where the home
owners jointly enjoy the benefit of their common properties for which the assessments
are used). Although the issue is somewhat academic after Neponsit, Miller v. Clary
has not yet been specifically overruled and may be cited as authority in other states.
90. "To hold that this case comes within the rule of Miller v. Clary, supra, that
affirmative covenants do not run with the land, would enable the defendant to accept
the benefits of the covenants in the deed on the part of the plaintiff, the grantor in the
deed, and to enjoy free of expense the roads, walks, sewers, drains, and the lights within
the park, and the enhanced value of the premises by reason of having it located in a
park with all these benefits and appurtenances. I am of the opinion that the case comes
rather within the exceptions to the rule, and that these covenants should run with the
land according to the terms of the deed. . . ." Lawrence Park Realty Co. v. Crichton,
218 App. Div. 374, 377, 218 N.Y.S. 278, 280 (1926).
"For full enjoyment in common by the defendant and other property owners of
these easements or rights, the roads and public places must be maintained. In order that
the burden of maintaining public improvements should rest upon the land benefited by
the improvements, the grantor exacted from the grantee of the land with its appurtenant
easement or right of enjoyment a covenant that the burden of paying the cost should be
inseparably attached to the land which enjoys the benefit." Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 260, 15 N.E.2d 793, 797 (1938).
91. See Salvi v. John A. Manning Co., 168 Misc. 661, 7 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1938), which,
like Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913), involved a request for a
mandatory injunction. Cf. Furness v. Sinquett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (N.J.
Super., Ch. D. 1960). See also Nassau County v. Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208
(1940), where the covenants did not bind the homes association to use the assessments
for any particular purpose in connection with the land, thus failing to meet the touch
and concern requirement in order to run with the land. The court reasoned that the
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rule and have not yet engulfed the rule itself.
Indiana apparently has not been influenced by the English or New
York decisions against affirmative covenants. The Indiana courts have
expressly upheld nonpecuniary covenants to maintain a fence, to establish
a railroad crossing, to pay for a party wall, and to furnish gas."s The
courts in these situations did not even discuss the England-New York
rule against affirmative covenants, but they did point out that covenants
to build fences and party walls were recognized as running with the land
even in England. 4
Courts in other jurisdictions have frequently expressed a greater
reluctance to uphold covenants to pay money on the theory that since
anyone off the burdened land is capable of paying the money, the obliga-
tion does not sufficiently touch and concern the land for the covenant
to run.95 But Indiana courts have held that the test is not whether the
covenant is to be performed on the land' but whether or not the perform-
ance benefits the burdened land. Consequently, the court in Jordan v.
Indianapolis Water Co." upheld a covenant to pay money for water
privileges for a term of years, and the court in Carley v. Lewis95 upheld
test is whether or not the money is to be used for a purpose which will benefit the land.
But too exact wording in covenants may also pose problems, as in Wehr v. Roland Park
Co., 143 Mich. 384, 122 AtI. 363 (1923) (court upheld assessments which were contested
because some properties named in covenants were dedicated to public). A provision in
the covenants stated in broad language but definitely tieing the assessments to the
common properties seems best. In Burton-Jones Development, Inc. v. Flake, 368 Mich.
122, 124, 117 N.W.2d 110, 111 (1962), the court upheld covenants calling on the home
owner to share expenses "of any improvement in his respective subdivision agreed to by
the owners of a majority of lots in his respective subdivisions."
92. Generally supporting Neponsit is Kennilwood Owners' Ass'n v. Kennilwood,
Inc., 264 App. Div. 750, 28 N.Y.S.2d 239, aff'd 28 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1939).
93. Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881) (fence) ; Ponsler v. Union Traction Co.,
76 Ind. App. 616, 132 N.E. 708 (1921) (fence) ; Union Traction Co. v. Thompson, 61
Ind. App. 183, 111 N.E. 648 (1916) (fence); Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. R.R. v. Kearns,
191 Ind. 1, 128 N.E. 42 (1920) (railroad crossing) ; Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26
N.E. 198 (1885) (party wall); Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Hinton, 159 Ind. 398,
64, N.E. 224 (1902) (gas). Since townhouses frequently employ party walls, a provision
for their maintenance and care should be included in the covenants. For a model provi-
sion see HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 63 at App. F, Article VI. On the subject of
maintenance of party walls see 5 POWE.LL, REAL PROPERTY § 690 (1962).
94. See Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488, 491, 492 (1881), and Conduitt v. Ross,
102 Ind. 166, 26 N.E. 198, 199 (1885). As to the early recognized exceptions to the
English rule that affirmative covenants do not run With the land see annot., 41 A.L.R.
1363, 1364 (1926).
95. 2 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.4(b) (Casner ed. 1952).
96. Scott v. Stetler, 128 Ind. 385, 27 N.E. 721 (1891) (maintenance of a dam);
Indianapolis Water Co. v. Nulte, 126 Ind. 373, 26 N.E. 72 (1890) (maintenance of a
levee).
97. 159 Ind. 337, 64 N.E. 680 (1902). In Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Hayden
the court upheld a covenant to pay a sum of money in lieu of an obligation to furnish the
lessor with gas.
98. 24 Ind. 23 (1865).
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a covenant to pay rent. These cases indicate that covenants to pay assess-
ments will run with the land in Indiana. Indeed, if the New York courts,
after giving extensive lip service to the proposition that affirmative
covenants will not run, expressly uphold assessment covenants,9 there
surely should be no problem in Indiana where the courts have long acted
favorably toward affirmative covenants.
The only apparent threat to a conclusion that covenants to pay
money will run with the land is to be found in Graber v. Duncan30  where
the court held that an agreement by the grantor signed on July 21, 1876,
to pay all taxes up to the year 1876 was a personal covenant which did
not run to a subsequent vendee. The court offered little rationale for
this decision though there would seem to be no better example of money
payments which would benefit the burdened land. At least one writer
has claimed that the Graber case stands for the general proposition that
covenants to pay taxes do not run with the land, that Jordan is wrong
for upholding the payment of money for water, and that Carley merely
states an exception involving rent.'' If all this is true, covenants to pay
money will certainly meet with trouble in the Indiana courts.
Actually, Graber is against the weight of authority."0 2 The doctrine
by which the court probably felt bound might best be stated as follows:
"If the improvement to the covenator is a present one, then the covenants
to pay for such improvement at a future date is merely an extension
of credit, so that the burden is a personal debt and likewise the benefit
is a personal chose in action; but if the improvement is to accrue to the
covenantor's land in the future the burden and benefit will run with the
respective lands until this physical improvement accrues to the coven-
antor's land."'0 3 The Graber decison, as restricted to its facts, holds only
that a covenant to pay an existing tax obligation will not run with the
land and casts little doubt on the capacity to run with the land of a
covenant for a future money obligation (for example, the assessment
obligation of a townhouse)."'0
99. See notes 93 and 94 supra and accompanying text.
100. 79 Ind. 565 (1881).
101. Note, 2 COLUm. L. Rxv. 554 (1902).
102. Security System Co. v. S. S. Pierce Co., 258 Mass. 4, 154 N.E. 190 (1926);
Wills v. Summers, 45 Minn. 90, 47 N.W. 463 (1890) ; Post v. Kearny, 2 N.Y. 394 (1894);
Mahler v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co., 55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N.E.2d 995 (1936).
103. 2 AmRicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.13 (Casner ed. 1952).
104. The Graber case has been cited with favor in five cases. In Wells v. Benton,
108 Ind. 585, 592, 3 N.E. 444, 447 (1886), the court cites Graber as supporting the Wells
holding that a promise in a deed to pay an existing judgment lien will not run with the
land. In Evansville & S.S. Traction Co. v. Evansville Belt Ry. Co., 44 Ind. App. 155,
163, 87 N.E. 21, 23 (1909), the court listed Graber as authority for the proposition that
the obligations of contract bind the parties who made them or those who stand in privity
with them. Other states have cited Graber as authority for the rule that a covenant to
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Where a home owner has taken out a mortgage on his property
there arises an issue of priority between the assessments and the
mortgage. If the covenants have properly included a provision making
the assessments a lien on the land, then the home owner's property has
been made to serve as the security for both outstanding interests. Al-
though a mortgage given before the covenants creating the assessment
lien has priority over the assessment lien even though the mortgage lender
knows the character of the development and knows that covenants after
his mortgage will impose assessments, a mortgage taken after the filing
of the declaration of covenants is subordinate to the assessment lien."'
The conclusion that a mortgage subsequent to the assessments is sub-
ordinate may be justified logically on the theory of equitable priorities;
nevertheless, it must seem a harsh rule to the mortgage lender whose se-
curity interest may be diminished with each unpaid assessment.
However, a majority of the home owners may agree to subordinate
the maintenance assessments where the covenants provide for their altera-
tion by the majority of the home owners. Such subordination is a
necessity where FHA loans are involved since a home owner mortgage
must be a first lien in order that the mortgage may qualify as an FHA
loan."° Similarly, Federal Savings and Loan Associations are limited to
first lien loans, °T and some state statutes require that the home mortgage
pay on existing mortgage is personal. Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 117 N.W. 491,
492 (1808) ; Pearson v. Richards, 106 Or. 78, 89, 211 Pac. 167, 171 (1922) ; Lingle Water
Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 48, 297 Pac. 385, 389 (1931).
105. Mendrop v. Harnell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So. 2d 418 (1958) ; Kennilwood Own-
ers' Ass'n v. Kennilwood, Inc., 264 App. Div. 750, 28 N.Y.S.2d 239, aff'd 28 N.Y.S.2d
154 (1941).
See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Wetzel, 212 Wisc. 100, 248 N.W. 791 (1933),
where the assessment lien was given priority despite language in the covenants that the
charge was to "become a lien upon the land." The mortgagees unsuccessfully contended
that since the particular assessment debts in issue became due after the mortgage this
language made the mortgage superior because of priority in time. The court relied
heavily upon the following statement: "A charge in the nature of a lien upon real as
well as personal estate may be created by the express agreement of the owner, and it
will be enforced in equity, not only against such owner, but also against third persons
who are either volunteers, or who take the estate on which the lien is given, with notice
of the stipulation." 1 JoNEs, LIENS 30 (3d ed. 1914).
106. National Housing Act § 203, 48 Stat. 1248 (1936), 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (1957),
gives the Commissioner of the FHA authority to insure mortgages. National Housing
Act § 201, 48 Stat. 1247 (1936), 12 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1957), states that mortgage means
first mortgage and further states that:
[T]he term "first mortgage" means such classes of first liens as are commonly
given to secure advances on, or the unpaid purchase price of, real estate, under
the laws of the state, in which the real estate is located, together with the credit
instruments, if any, secured thereby.
107. National Housing Act § 5, 48 Stat. 132 (1932), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1957):
Such associations [Federal Savings and Loan Associations] shall lend their
funds only on the security of their shares or on the security of first liens upon
homes or combination of homes and business property within fifty miles of
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be a first lien."0 8
Since the valuation of the mortgage lender's security will depreciate
if the common properties are not adequately maintained, the mortgage
lender has a direct interest in insuring the continued payment of assess-
ment fees and may find it to his advantage to insure the continued pay-
ment of the assessment rather than to rely on a first lien guarantee.
Consequently, some mortgage lenders require that the home owner main-
tain an escrow account to make certain that the assessment payments
are not discontinued.109
If the covenants have been properly recorded, a person who loans
money on the security of a townhouse lot has notice of the mortgagor's
assessment obligation and should therefore have an interest subordinate
to the covenants. Similarly, a purchaser of the lot at a foreclosure sale
should take under an obligation to pay the assessments according to ihe
covenants. The theoretical justification for the subordination of the
mortgage lender's equitable interest in the land is equitable priorities:
his equitable interest in the land is subsequent in time to the assessment
lien and is therefore subordinate."' The theoretical justification for the
liability of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale or a mortgage lender who
acquires the lot itself through the mortgage default is that since he has
succeeded to the interest of the covenantor through privity of estate, he
is liable on the covenantor's obligation."' A practical consideration for
both the subordination of the mortgage lender's lien and the assumption
of liability by the successor in title is that both the mortgage lender and
the purchaser are in a position to take the assessment into account when
appraising the valuation of the property.
Although these reasons may justify the liability of the successor
at a foreclosure sale for future assessments, they do not justify his or the
mortgage lender's personal liability for those debts incurred while the
mortgagor has legal title or possession. If the state accepts the lien
their home office....
108. E.g., Indiana permits banks and trust companies "to make such loans secured
by mortgages on real property or leasehold, as the federal housing administrator insures
or makes a commitment to insure, and to obtain such mortgage." Izn. ANN. STAT. §
18-1103(b) (2) (Burns 1964). As to what the federal housing administrator will insure
at present see note 115 supra and accompanying text.
109. This procedure is heartily endorsed by the Urban Land Institute which points
out that the service costs of this practice are not great, especially when there is already
an escrow for taxes and maintenance. HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 69 at §§ 12.71,
14.74. To encourage this practice Congress passed an amendment to the National
Housing Act which extends FHA insurance coverage to include assessments to a homes
association. 78 Stat. 769 (1964), 12 U.S.C. § 1710(a) (1964), amending National
Housing Act § 204(a), ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1249 (1934).
110. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
111. Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Priest, 131 Ind. 413, 31 N.E. 77 (1892).
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theory, as Indiana does,"' there is no problem since the mortgagor home
owner continues to hold the legal title and no one has succeeded to his
interest and hence his obligation. If the state accepts the title theory,
the mortgage lender would seem to have succeeded to the covenantor's
interest; but courts have held that the mortgage lender becomes liable
only if he has taken possession or has taken a complete or unencumbered
interest in the land through the mortgagor's default." 8 In order to insure
that the successor to the mortgagor's interest will not be held personally
liable for the mortgagor's debt by implication from the covenants, the
drafter of the covenants may be wise to expressly exclude such liability." 4
IV. THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
TOWNHOUSE OWNERSHIP: CONCLUSION
The desirability of townhouses from a sociological point of view was
acknowledged in the introduction. The popularity of this housing trend,
however, depends not on the desires of sociologists but rather on those
of purchasers, developers, and lenders. And to achieve the confidence
of these groups, the townhouse must compare favorably to other types
of housing.
The Home Owner
The relative advantages and disadvantages for the purchaser of a
townhouse home will depend upon both monetary and psychological con-
siderations. In comparison to an apartment, the townhouse will eliminate
the lessor's profit; will allow the purchaser the tax advantages of home
ownership;..5 will enable him to strengthen his own security through
mortgage payments, an effect not possible with rental payments; will
enable him to qualify for a homestead exemption if he should fail in
his mortgage payments; and will give him psychologically a sense of
dignity in home ownership and a sense of fellowship through his partici-
pation with other home owners in townhouse recreational activities and
business meetings. In comparison to ordinary home ownership, the town-
house purchaser has the benefit of nearby common facilities, which may
include parks, swimming pools, golf courses, and other luxuries he may
112. Baldwin v. Moroney, 173, Ind. 574, 91 N.E. 3 (1910) ; Grabel v. McCulloh, 27
Ind. 472 (1867) ; Oldham v. Noble, 117 Ind. App. 68, 66 N.E.2d 614 (1946).
113. See, e.g., Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 Atl. 331
(1934).
114. UR3AN LAND INSTITUTE, TE HoMEs ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, App. F, art.
V, § 9 and text at § 23.8 (Technical Bulletin 50, 1964).
115. The tax advantages included in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 are (1) local
property tax deduction, §§ 164(a), (b) ; (2) deduction for depreciation of leased house,
§ 167(a) (2) ; (3) deduction for uninsured loss from natural elements or other casualty,
§ 1034(f) ; and (4) no tax on profit from sale of the home, § 1034(a).
not personally be able to afford-all without the responsibility of personal
maintenance. In comparison to a cooperative apartment, the townhouse
enables a member to finance his own individual mortgage to suit his own
personal needs and, as compared to the apartment, gives him the
psychological benefit of individually owning a particular piece of land.
Because of their similarity a more detailed analysis of townhouses
and condominiums is necessary. The condominium apartment involving
the unique property concept of fee in space necessitates enabling legisla-
tion for any real assurance of its success." 6 But the particular act upon
which the condominium depends so much may later be shown to possess
important weaknesses which no drafter can avoid. 17 On the other hand
the townhouse which does not depend to any great extent upon a par-
ticular act may be made to order for the home owner through the coven-
ants and corporation instruments. Another advantage to the townhouse
is its relative ease of voluntary termination. The condominium statute
may provide that unanimous consent is necessary to terminate the con-
dominium." 8 Therefore it is possible that one recalcitrant condominium
owner could damage the interest of the other owners if the condominium
arrangement is no longer practical (as a result, for example, of a change
in the neighborhood). But the townhouse covenants will establish the
length of time they will continue to run, or, more likely, will establish
periodic dates on which the covenants are to be reviewed and the per cent
of owners necessary to retain, abolish, or alter the covenants." 9 One
other essential difference is that while the condominium allows sole fee
ownership of the apartment and co-ownership of the common facilities,
it usually involves apartment style living. The townhouse may closely
resemble traditional lot home ownership, for the home owner alone holds
title to the ground underneath and perhaps a patio or additional ground
depending on the particular townhouse. An additional advantage to the
townhouse is that, if incorporated under a nonprofit cooperation act, it
definitely limits the liability of the home owner from contracts made by
the homes association officers and from torts occurring on the common
properties. Even if the condominium management is incorporated, the
property co-owners may be held liable as principals, since title remains
116. Wenig & Schulz, Government Regulation of Condominium in California, 14
HASTINGs L.J. 222 (1963).
117. Note, Observations on Condominiums in Indiana: The Horizontal Property
Act of 1963, 40 IND. L.J. 57 (1964).
118. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1228 (Burns Supp. 1964).
119. Strauss v. J. C. Nichols Land Co., 327 Mo. 205, 37 S.W.2d 505 (1931)
(covenants providing for automatic termination unless home owners vote to retain up-
held); Sharp v. Quinn, 214 Cal. 194, 4 P.2d 942 (1931); Loving v. Clem, 30 S.W.2d
590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Couch v. So. Methodist Univ., 30 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930) (covenants providing for alteration by majority of home owners upheld).
NOTES 443
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in them, for the acts of their corporate agent. 2 ' An attempt to avoid
unlimited liability of the co-owners by having a clause in the declaration
preventing the manager from using the credit of a co-owner without his
permission may also fail if a court thinks the manager had apparent
authority to bind the co-owner.12'
But the townhouse is not free from faults. Chief among them is a
possible breakdown of harmony among the home owners or the refusal
of a home owner to pay his assessment. Even if payment is legally
enforceable, litigation may be expensive. The rule against restraint of
alienation may prohibit any attempts to control the quality of one's
neighbors, whose close presence could hardly be ignored. Another dis-
advantage is the threat of a court's adverse decision (for example, a
holding that covenants to pay money do not run with the land) which
may, in effect, destroy the townhouse and with it the purchaser's
investment.
The Developer and Money Lender
Since the safety of any investment in townhouses depends largely
on their marketability, the advantages for the purchaser are also ad-
vantages for the developer and the lender. The main additional advantage
to the developer, unless he is confronted with a hostile application of the
local zoning ordinance, is the building of more units per acre of land.22
One of the potential dangers for the developer is that the purchaser may
be reluctant to buy a townhouse home merely because it is an unknown
quantity; but this uniqueness of the townhouse may be turned into an
advertising advantage. Although mortgage lenders are protected in loans
to the home owner as a first lien, those who loan money to the homes
association may see the multiple interests in the common properties
as a threat to any security interest in them. Skillful drafting of the plat
and covenant, however, should adequately protect their security interest.
And unlike the purchaser, the developer and lender will probably have the
benefit of examining others' experiences with townhouses and will better
know the consequences.
120. Berger, Comdoininiums: Shelter On a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUar. L.
Rxv. 987, 1008 (1963) ; Rubens, Right of First Refusal and Waiver of the Right of
Judicial Partition, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1963). Although the Indiana condominium
legislation implies that a nonprofit corporation may be created for managerial purposes,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1208 (Burns Supp. 1964), the title to the common areas must
be in the apartment owners themselves, IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1207 (Burns Supp. 1964).
121. Note, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF.
L. REV. 299, 312 (1962).
122. One developer has been reported as saving from $200 to $500 per unit for
land alone. His court costs in fighting the local zoning ordinance undoubtedly lessened
this financial benefit. The Louisville Courier-Journal, Nov. 8, 1964, § 5, p. 1.
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Conclusion
The success or failure of a townhouse depends largely upon the
drafting skill of the attorney who is advising the developer. Unlike
condominiums, there is no single statute to examine for assistance in
establishing a townhouse. The attorney must utilize a broad background
in property law, for the townhouse cuts across many different legal
problems. As in other types of drafting, the attorney must have one eye
to the future and prepare his instruments in such a manner that they
not only will survive possible future litigation but also will eliminate the
necessity of any litigation.
PREVENTION OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL EVASION
IN INDIANA
Since 1950 there has been an "explosion" in metropolitan popula-
tion.' The greatest growth has been in the area which rings our metro-
politan areas.2 The advance of the suburbs has changed the face of the
countryside; shopping centers and residential subdivisions are strewn
across the once empty land.3 This growth has given new impetus to
municipal planning and subdivision control. As the amount of sub-
dividing by private promoters increases, the importance of controlling
subdividing is emphasized by the frequently tangled street patterns, un-
economic mixing of inconsistent uses, crazy quilts of lot sizes, and poor
planning in general.4
Awareness of these problems is indicated by the amount of recent
legislation' and writing on the subject of subdivision regulation.' The
1. The 1960 census returns dramatize the "explosive" population increases that are
occurring in metropolitan areas and reveal that over 80% of the nation's total population
increase during the last decennial period took place in these areas. Schmandt, Municipal
Control of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 637 (1961).
2. See Comment, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 310.
3. Ibid.
4. HoRACK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CoNTRoLs 202 (1955) (the crazy quilt of lot
sizes): Frey, Subdivision Control and Planning, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 411 (poor planning
in general).
5. "Every state in the country has enacted enabling legislation allowing communi-
ties to undertake planning subdivision controls." Over three-fourths of the cities with
more than 10,000 people have adopted local subdivision ordinances. Id. at 418.
6. Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey under the 1953 Planning
Statutes, 15 RuToams L. Rxv. (1960); Frey, supra note 4; Melli, Subdivision Control
in iWisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 389; Note 48 Ky. L.J. 252 (1960) ; Note, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1205 (1961).
